Babylonian Talmud

Rodkinson 1918 — source 18, scan section 68

must be considered, as [I Kings viii, 65], " And Solomon held at that time the feast, and all Israel with him, a great assembly, from the entrance of Chamath unto the river of Egypt, before the Lord our God, seven days and seven days, even fourteen days," now, as it is written, " and all Israel with him," what for, then, yet the description, " great assembly from the entrance of Chamath unto the river of Egypt " ? To teach that in such a decision (as to abolish the day of atonement) the population of the whole land is considered the assembly. R. Jonathan said : If there were one hundred assembled to decide some point, there is no liability (attached to the trans- gression of the decision) unless the decree was made unan- imously, as it reads [Lev. iy. 13] : " And if the whole congrega- tion of Israel sin," which means that 11 sin by error, and that the decision be brought about unanimously. Said R. Huna b. R, Ashia : It seems to be so, since with regard to all the laws of the Torah there is a tradition that the majority is equivalent to the whole, and here it reads, " the whole congregation," i.e., it must be the zvJwIc of the body, so that if there were one hundred their decision must be unanimous. An objection was raised from our Mishna which states that 6 THE BABYLONIAN TALMUD. he is liable if " he has not based his transgression upon the decree of the court," whence it follows by implication that if another one (not so qualified) acted thus he would be free ; why so, since in this the decree was no longer unanimous (as one of the members deviates)? It means here that this one member has also nodded his head affirmatively (while the vote was taken). R. Mesharshia objected from the following: Our masters have relied upon R. Simeon b. Gamaliel and R. Elazar b. Zadok, who have decided that no decree must be promulgated unless the majority of the congregation is able to comply with it ; and R. Ada b. Aba said : Where is there an allusion thereto in the Scripture? [Mai. iii. 9] : " With curse are ye cursed, and yet me do ye rob, O ye entire nation." Now, here is written the entire nation and nevertheless the majority is equivalent to the whole; hence, R. Jonathan's view is wholly overthrown, and the ex- pression in the Scripture (cited above), " the whole congrega- tion " means : if the whole is able to comply with the decree it is considered, but not otherwise. MISHNA //. : If upon issuing the decree the court becomes aware of its being conceived in error and retracts, and mean- while an individual commits a transgression upon that decree either before or after the court succeeded to bring its atoning offering, he is freeaccordingto R. Simeon, while R. Elazar classes it among the doubtful cases. In what sense is it doubtful? He may have stayed at his home, then he is liable ; but if he was in the sea countries he is free. Said R. Aqiba : I agree that in the latter case he is rather free than liable. Whereupon Ben Azai asked : What difference is there between the two cases? It con- sists in that he who stays at home can possibly hear (of the retraction), while to the other one this is impossible. If the court decided to annihilate a law in its very essence, by saying, e.g., that there is not in the Torah the law of menses, of Sabbath, of idolatry, the members of the court are free (from an offering) ; but if it decided to abolish only one part of a law retaining in force the other part, they are liable. How so? If it decided, e.g., that, though the law of menses is in the Torah, a man who has sexual relations with a woman in her watching days is free; or, that he who transports something from private to public grounds is free though the law of Sabbath is in the Torah ; or, that the Torah truly forbids idol worship, yet he who bows to the idol is free — the court is liable, for it reads TRACT HORIOTH (DECISIONS). 7 (Lev. iv. 13): "And the thing be hidden," i.e., somcthingy but not the whole essence. GEMARA: Said R. Jehudah in the name of Rabh: R. Simeon used to say that if one acted upon a decision issued by the majority of the congregation, he is free ; because a decision discriminates between intentional and unintentional acting, and here the transgressor, guided in his act by the decision, sins un- intentionally (though he acts intentionally), and according to Rabh R. Simeon is consistent with his own theory elsewhere that the bullock for the forgetting by the congregation, and the he-goat for idolatry, are to be brought from the treasury of the temple. There is a Boraitha. In the case mentioned in the Mishna, R. Mair makes him liable, and R. Simeon holds him free, while R, Elazar finds this case to be doubtful ; and in the name of Symachos such was said to be a pending case. Said R. Johanan: They differ concerning a pending-offering. Said R. Zera: R. Elazar's decision is like that regarding the case where one con- sumes fat doubtful whether it is legal or illegal, and thereafter he became aware that it was doubtful, he is to bring a pending offering; and not only according to him who obliges the con- gregation to bring such an offering, as such an act is known to every one, hence, if the transgressor has acted after the congre- gation brought its atoning offering, in which case it cannot possibly be said that he in his act guided himself by the court's decree, — but even according to him who obliges the court to such an offering, which may be not known to everybody, the transgressor is also liable, since he could find this out upon in- vestigating. R. Jose b. Abin, according to others b. Zebida, likens Sy- machos' decision to that regarding the case where one brings his atoning offering at twilight, which makes the atonement doubtful, since if it was yet day he is atoned, but if night he is not, and none the less he is not obliged to bring another offer- ing. " Ben Azai asked," etc. Is not Ben Azai right? The differ- ence between them is the case when the transgressor has just set out on his journey; according to Ben Azai he is liable, while according to R. Aqiba he is free as soon as he starts on his way. " // the court decided to annihilate," etc. Said R. Jehudah, in the name of Samuel : The court is not liable unless it has decided 8 THE BABYLONIAN TALMUD. upon a point which the Sadducees do not admit, but where they do, it is not considered an error, since even a child knows such a point, and the court is accordingly free. MISHNA ///. : If while the court was deciding, one of its members who perceived their error drew their attention to it, or if the presiding judge was absent, or one of them was a proselyte, a bastard, a nation, or an aged man who had no children, they are free ; on the ground of the following analogy