Babylonian Talmud

Rodkinson 1918 — source 17, scan section 39

according to Rabh he is culpable, as he transgressed a negative; according to Samuel he is not, for such an oath can not be made with reference to the future. Shall we assume that the above differ in the same in which R. Aqiba and R. Ismael differ in our Mishna: R. Ismael said, one is liable only for the future, as it reads: To do evil or to do good; whereupon said R. Aqiba: If it were as you say, the liability would apply but to things that are intrinsically either evil or good; and he answered: From the addition in the Scripture: To every thing uttered with his lips; whereto R. Aqiba rejoined, etc. Whence it would appear that Rabh is in accordance with Aqiba, and Samuel in accordance with R. Ismael? Nay; according to R. Ismael, who frees one for the past even in a case where a future is possible, there can be no doubt that in the case illustrated above, one should be culpable; but where they do differ is concerning the interpreta- tion of R. Aqiba's view. According to Rabh, R. Aqiba holds one liable for transgressing a negative immaterial whether such an oath can or can not apply to a future; while Samuel main- tains that R. Aqiba's view applies only to a case where an oath for the future is possible, but not to other cases. Said Abayi : Rabh admits that if one says, I swear that I know something to testify for you, and it is found hereafter that he knows nothing, there is no liability in this case because the negative, I swear that I do not know, etc., is not possible here (as this is not considered an utterance, but belongs to the cate- gory of testimony). But regarding the oath, I was or was not aware of testimony in your case, or, I have or have not testified. TRACT SHEBUOTH (OATHS). 37 Rabh and Samuel still differ. (Says the Gemara): According to Samuel's theory it is correct that the law has excluded the witness-oath from the category of uttered oaths, as there is a rule that where there is no future possible, no liability attaches to the past; but according to Rabh who disregards this rule, ■why were the witness-oaths excluded? Said the rabbis before Abayi: In order to make one liable twice {i.e., if one is fit to testify, knows the case, and nevertheless denied it before the court, he is liable twice, for the witness-oath and for an uttered oath). Said Abayi to them : It is impossible to make one liable twice, as it reads plainly [Lev. v. 4] : " That he hath incurred guilt by <?«<?* of these," which means, he can be punished once but not twice. But, then, to what other purpose have the wit- ness-oaths been excluded, according to Abayi? To what we have learned in the following: Concerning all oaths it reads " escaped his memory," except the oath of a witness, to make him liable (to a sin-offering) for an intentional oath just as for an unintentional one. Said the rabbis to Abayi: Say, then, that for an intentional he is liable to one, and for an uninten- tional he should be liable to two, viz. : for a witness and an uttered oath? And he answered: Have I not said that the above-cited verse prevents it from making one liable to two? And as to an intentional, the liability of an uttered oath does not exist there. Rabha, however, said : The reason why there can be no two liabilities is this : There is a rule that, if to something that was included in the general a new law be applied, only by the new one must guide one's self {i.e., the witness-oath as an oath is included in the general uttered oaths, and when the Scripture makes for it a new special law of liability, you cannot any more apply to it also the liability attached to the uttered oath). But how is it according to Abayi? Does he hold that there is such an oath at all? Has he not declared above that Rabh admits that if one swears: I know testimony for you, etc., there is no liability here, as such oath cannot be made in the negative, whence it would seem that such in the negative does not exist at all? He has retracted his above statement, or, if you wish, one of the above statements was not said by Abayi but by R. Papa. ♦ Here the word rachath (to one) is taken by the text literally : one ; while further on it is explained to mean ''to anyone'. 38 THE BABYLONIAN TALMUD. * ' One is guilty only . . . with reference to the future. ' ' The rabbis taught, it reads [Lev. v. 4] : " To do evil, or to do good," whence we infer only those that are in themselves either good or evil ; but whence do we know about oaths concerning other things? From [ibid., ibid.]: " Pronouncing with his lips," etc. But all this is concerning the future; whence do we know the same concerning the past? From [ibid., ibid.]: " In whatsoever it be " ; so R. Aqiba. R. Ismael, however, says: " To do evil, or to do good " means only oaths for the future. Said to him R. Aqiba: If such be the case, we know only about oaths con- cerning things intrinsically good or evil, but whence do we know about those regarding other things? Retorted the former : From the addition in the Scripture (" whatsoever "), whereupon rejoined R. Aqiba: If the Scripture widens the notion in this respect, it does it likewise in all other respects. Now, is not R. Aqiba's statement perfectly correct? Said R. Johanan: R. Ismael, who was a disciple of R. Ne'hunia b. Hakana, who was in the habit of interpreting the Scripture by generals and particulars, proceeds in the same manner as his master; while R. Aqiba, who was the disciple of Na'hum of Gimzu, whose method of interpretation was extensions and limitations, follows his master's method. And this is as stated in the following Boraitha: " If any person swear " is an extension ; " To do evil or good " is a limitation ; " In whatsoever it be " is again an extension, and there is a rule that such an extension includes everything, while a limitation is excluding a commandment. This is in accordance with R. Aqiba; while R. Ismael, whose method is the generals and par- ticulars, interprets the verse thus: " If any person," etc., is a general; " To do evil or good" is a particular; " In whatso- ever" is again a general, and there is a rule that wherever there is a particular between two generals, the latter must be inter- preted in the sense of the particular; now, as the particular here refers expressly to the future, so also everything relates to the future ; the generals, however, affect in the same way all other things relating to the future, but not implying either good or evil, while the particular affects things relating to the past, that they be excluded. (Says the Gemara): And why not the re- verse? Said R. Itz'hak: They must be similar to the particular (of to do evil, etc.), which is prohibited because of the above-cited [Numb. XXX.]: " He shall not profane his word," excluded the