Babylonian Talmud

Rodkinson 1918 — source 15, scan section 11

R. Hyya all were the sons of Abba b. Aha Kharsala of Khaphri ? (Hence Rabh, who was Abu's son, was also his brother's son — why did he say " my sister's " ?) Rabh, who was his brother's and also his sister's son (on his mother's side), he named him " the son of my sister"; but Rabba b. Hana was the son of his brother only. And if you wish, it may be said that R. Hyya named him " my sister's," because of his great wisdom. As it is written [Prov. vii. 4] : " Say unto wisdom. Thou art my sister." But why should Rabh not be permitted to decide about blemishes ? Was he not wise enough for this ? Is it not a fact that he was wiser than any of his contemporaries ? Or was he not acquainted enough with the kind of blemishes ? Did not Rabh say: I have dwelt eighteen months with a pasturer of cattle to learn the blemishes which are temporary, and those which remain forever ? This was done that Rabba b. Hana should be respected, as Rabh was highly respected even without that. And if you wish, it might be said that because of the fact itself, that Rabh was an expert concerning blemishes, it was not allowed to him to practise, for the reason that Rabh would allow such blemishes as other ex- perts were not aware of, and people who should see that would act likewise, relying upon Rabh, so that they would finally allow the animal which had a temporary blemish to be slaughtered. It is said above: " Rabbi said: He shall teach law." To what purpose was this said ? Does such a scholar as Rabh need such a permission for teaching ? This was said because of the * The first-born of cattle which might be legally eaten, and also of an ass, had biblically to be submitted to the priest when the Temple was in existence ; but after the destruction of the Temple they had to be raised until a blemish on their bodies appeared. But what kind of a blemish made them fit for slaughtering ? They had to be examined by an expert who understood blemishes, and was familiar with the entire law ; and a permission was needed for the expert. 8 THE BABYLONIAN TALMUD. following case: It happened that Rabbi went into a certain place and saw that they kneaded dough without offering a sample for legal purity. And to the question why they did so, their answer was : There was a disciple who taught : Water of Bzein (swamp) does not make articles subject to defilement. In reality, how- ever, the expression was: " Mee Beizim," which means eggs; and they took it for Bzein, and acted accordingly. And there- fore it was taught: A decree was enacted that a disciple should not teach unless he had the permission of his master. Tanchun, the son of R. Ami, happened to be in the city of Hthar, and lectured : One may wet wheat and pound for peeling on Passover. And they said to him: Is not there here R. Mani of the city of Zur, who is a great scholar, and there is a Boraitha: A disciple must not decide a Halakha at the place of his master, unless distant from him three parsas — which distance Israel took when travelling in the desert. And he answered : I was not aware of this. R. Hyya saw a man standing in a cemetery, and said to him : Are you not the son of so and so, who was a priest ? He said : Yea, but my father was one of those who follow their eyes. He saw a divorced woman and married her, and with this he annulled the priesthood. It is certain, when one takes a permission to give judgment in part, that it holds good (as so it was with Rabh). But how is it if the permission was conditionally for a certain time ? Come and hear what R. Johanan said to R. Shauman: You have our permission until you shall return to us. The text says: Samuel said: If it was decided by two, their decision is valid ; but they are called an impertinent Beth Din. R. Na'hman repeated this Halakha, and Rabha objected from the following: If two are defending and two are accusing, and one says, " I do not know how to decide," judges must be added ; now, if it were as you say, that the decision of two is valid, let, then, the decision of the two hold good ? There it is different, as they start with the intention that it should be decided by three. He then objected to him from the following: Rabban Simeon b. Gamaliel said: Judgment in accordance with the strict law must be decided by three. In an arbitration, however, two suffice; and the strength of the mediation is greater than that of the law; as, if there were two who had decided a case in accordance with the law, although they were appointed by the parties, they (the parties) may retract. But TRACT SANHEDRIN (SUPREME COUNCIL). 9 if a mediation was made by the arbitrators, no retraction can take place. And lest one say that the rabbis differ with R. Simeon, did not R. Abuhu say: All agree that a decision passed by two is valueless ? And he answered : Do you oppose one man to another (Abuhu may say so, and Samuel otherwise) ? R. Abba objected to R. Abuhu from the following: If one has decided upon a case — freed the guilty, or pronounced guilty the innocent, or decided unclean a thing which is clean, or vice versa, the act is valid and he must pay from his pocket. (Hence we see that even the decision of one is respected.) This Bo- raitha speaks of when the parties had appointed him for this purpose. But if so, why must he pay ? It means, if they tell him : We appoint you to decide this case in accordance with the biblical law. Said R. Safras to R. Abba : Let us see what was the error. If the error was that he decided against a Mishna, did not R. Shesheth say in the name of R. Assi that he who made an error as to a Mishna might retract from his decision ? Hence such a decision is not valid, and he has not to pay from his pocket. Therefore it must be said that it means he erred in his opinion. How is this to be understood ? Said R. Papa : E.g., there were two Tanaim and two Amoraim who differed in a case, and it was not decided with whom the Halakha prevailed. However, the world practised according to one party, and he had decided the case according to the other party; and this could be called erring in one's opinion. Shall we assume that in that case in which Samuel and R. Abuhu differ, the Tanaim of the following Boraitha also differ: Arbitrating must be done by three persons. So is the decree of R. Meir. The sages, however, maintain: One is sufficient ? The schoolmen who heard this thought that all agree that arbi- tration is similar to a strict law, and therefore they assumed that the point of their difference was : R. Meir holds three are needed, and the sages that two suffice. Nay, all agree that a strict law must be decided by three, and the point of their dif- fering is: Whether arbitration must be similar to a strict law: