Babylonian Talmud

Rodkinson 1918 — source 15, scan section 10

Ekha (according to both, three common men are needed in cases of common loans, etc.) ? They differ in the following, which was said by Samuel: If two commoners have decided upon loan cases, their decision is to be respected ; but they are considered an impertinent Beth Din. Rabha does not hold with Samuel, and maintains: Their decision must not be respected. And R. Aha holds with him (Samuel). " Whole damages and half ,*' etc. Are not damages the same as wounds (both are to be paid) ? Because it has to state half damages, it mentions also whole damages. Are not half dam ages also the same ? The Mishna teaches concerning money which is to be collected according to the strict law and that which is only a fine. But this is correct only as to him who says that half damages are a fine; but as to him who says half damages are strict law, what can be said ? Because it has to state about the double amount, and four and five fold, which are more than the amount damaged, it mentions also half damages,' which is less; and as half is mentioned, it mentions also the whole. TRACT SANHEDRIN (SUPREME COUNCIL). 5 Whence do we deduce that three are needed ? From what the rabbis taught. It treats [Ex. xxii. 7 and 8] three times of judges ; hence three are needed. So said R. Yachiha. R. Jon- athan, however, maintains: The first expression " judges," as the beginning, must not be taken into consideration, as it is needed for itself, and therefore only the two expressions "judges," mentioned after, are to be counted, and the third one is added only because we do not establish a court of an even number (as said above). The rabbis taught: Civil cases are to be discussed by three. Rabbi, however, said : It is discussed by five, so that the final decision should be by three. But even when there are three, is not the final decision made by two ? He means to say, because the conclusion must be of three judges. This explanation was ridiculed by R. Abuhu, saying: On such a theory, then the great Supreme Council ought to be one hundred and forty-one, to the end that the final conclusion should be made by seventy-one ; and of a small council there ought to be forty-five, so that the conclusion should be made by twenty-three. And therefore we must say, as the Scripture reads, " Gather unto me seventy," it means the seventy ought to be at the time established. And the same is it in the case above cited, " the congregation shall judge, and the congregation shall save," meaning that at the time of judging there shall be ten. And in the same way are to be inter- preted the just cited verses 7 and 8, that the plaintiff has to bring his case before three only. Therefore it may be said that the reason of Rabbi's decision is that because in the first verse is written, " The judges may condemn," as in the last, three is meant, so is it with the word Elohim, mentioned before, which means judges, also two is meant, which makes four; and one is added, so that they shall not be an even number — hence five. The rabbis do not care for this, as the term which is translated, " They may condemn," is written in the singular, and is only read in the plural. The rabbis taught : Civil cases are decided by three ; but if one is known to the majority of the people as an expert, he alone may decide. Said R. Na'hman: e.g., I decide cases alone, without consulting any other rabbis. And so also said R. Hyya. The schoolmen propounded a question : What does R. Na'h- Inan mean by saying: As, for instance, I ? Does he mean sim- ilar to him, who knew the laws traditionally and by common sense, and was also so empowered by the Exilarch ; but if there 6 THE BABYLONIAN TALMUD. was one who was equal to him in wisdom, but had no permis- sion, his decision must not be respected ? Or does he mean to say, if one were equal to him in wisdom he might so do without permission ? Come and hear: Mar Zutra, the son of R. Na'h- man, made an error in one of his decisions, and came to question R. Joseph whether he must make good the error. To which he answered : If he was appointed by the parties as a judge, he had not to pay; if not, he must pay. Infer from this that he who is appointed by the parties may so do even without permission from a higher court. Said Rabh: If one wants to decide cases, and not be respon- sible in case of an error, he shall get permission from the Exi- larch. And so also said Samuel. It is certain that here in Babylon a permission from the Ex- ilarch holds good for the whole country; and the same is the case from the Prince in Palestine, for the whole of Palestine and Syria. And it is also certain that if one has a permission from the Exilarch, he may practise in Palestine. As the following Boraitha states: The sceptre shall not depart from Judah. These are the exilarchs of Babylon, who rule over Israel with their sceptres. " And a lawgiver," etc., [Gen. xlix. lo] means the grandsons of Hillel, who are teaching the Torah among the majority of the people. The question, however, is, if with the permission of the princes they may judge in Babylon ? Come and hear: Rabba b. Hana had decided a case and erred, and came to question R. Hyya whether he had to pay. To which he answered: If the parties appointed you as a judge, you have nothing to pay; but if not, you have. Now, as Rabba b. Hana had permission from Palestine, and would be obliged to pay if not appointed, it is to be inferred that the permission from Palestine did not hold good in Babylon. But is it not a fact that Rabba b. R. Huna, when he would quarrel with the house of the Exilarch, used to say: I did not take any permis- sion from you, but from my father, who had it from Rabh, and the latter from R. Hyya, and the latter from Rabbi ? This was concerning worldly affairs only. But if the permission of Pal- estine does not hold good for Babylon, why did Rabba b. Hana take it ? For the cities which are situated on the boundary of Palestine. How was the case when he took the permission ? When he was about to descend from Palestine to Babylon, R. Hyya said to Rabbi: My brother's son, Rabba b. Hana, de- scends to Babylon. And Rabbi answered: He may teach the TRACT SANHEDRIN (SUPREME COUNCIL). 7 law, decide civil cases, and may also decide upon the blemishes of first-born animals which are prohibited to be slaughtered with- out a blemish on their body.* When Rabh was about to go to Babylon, R. Hyya said to Rabbi: The son of my sister goes to Babylon. Said Rabbi: He may teach the law, decide cases, but not about blemishes of the first-born of animals. Why did R. Hyya name the first " my brother's son " and the second " my sister's son " ? And lest one say that so was the case, did not the master say: Abu, Hana, Shila, Marta, and