Babylonian Talmud

Rodkinson 1918 — source 10, scan section 79

ory ? He deduces it from the analogy of expression " the eye," which is used in speaking of disgracing a person and also in speaking of collusive witnesses: as in the case of collusive wit- nesses blind persons are excluded (for if they cannot see they cannot testify). And regarding banishment, as it is stated in the following Boraitha : It is written [Numb. xxxv. 23]: " With- out seeing him " (which is to be explained that here he has not seen, but he is capable of seeing), which excludes a blind person (who can never see). Such is the dictum of R. Jehudah. R. Meir says: (On the contrary,) it includes a blind person. What is the reason of R. Jehudah ? It is written [Deut. xix. 5] : " And he that goeth into the forest with his neighbor to hew wood." Should we assume that this includes even a blind one ? Therefore the Scripture says, '* without seeing him," to exclude him. And R. Meir ? (He may explain it thus 🙂 The Scripture reads " without seeing him," to exclude something, and it is written [ibid., ibid. 4], " without knowledge," which also means to exclude something; and there is a rule that where there is one exclusion after another it means to include. Hence it in- cludes the blind. R. Jehudah, however, maintains that " with- out knowledge" means to exclude the one who does it inten- tionally (who is guilty of a crime). ' ' From death by the court. ' ' It is deduced by analogy of the expression " murderer" used here and in case of banishment. (In case of one killing a person the expression " murderer" is used [Numb. xxxv. 31], and so also in case of banishment.) " From stripes." It is deduced by the analogy of the expression " Rosha " [ibid, xxv.] (the wicked, the guilty one) used here, and in case of death by the court [Numb. xxxv. 31]. We have learned in another Boraitha: *' R. Jehudah says: A blind person has no sense of shame. He also relieved him from the performance of all the commandments contained in the Scripture." Said R. Shesheth b. R. Idi : What is the reason of TRACT T^ABA KAMA (THE FIRST GATE). 193 his statement? It is written [Deut. vi. i] : "And this is the commandment, with the statutes and the ordinances" — from which is to be inferred that only those who can be ordained as judges have the obligation of observing the commandments, but not those who cannot be ordained (and as a blind person can- not be ordained a judge, he is exempt). R. Joseph said: First I used to say: If there should come one and tell me that the Halakha prevails according to R. Jehu- dah, who says that a blind person is exempt from the perform- ance of commandments, I shall make a feast for the rabbis, because I, who am under no obligation to do so, still do perform them ; but since I heard of what R. Hanina said, that there is more reward for him who performs a commandment which he has an obligation to than for him who performs it without such obligation, I changed my mind, and I say that I shall make a feast if one should come and tell me that the Halakha does not prevail according to R. Jehudah; for if I am required to per- form the commandment, the reward will be greater. MISHNA ///. : The law is more rigorous in regard to a man than in regard to an ox in this respect, that a man pays the five certain items, and also the v^alue of the aborted children, while an ox pays only for actual damage and is free also from paying for the aborted children. One who assaults his father or mother, but does not bruise them, and one who wounds another on the Day of Atonement, is liable to pay all the above items. One who wounds a Hebrew servant is liable to pay all, but for loss of time when he is his own. One who wounds a heathen slave of another is liable to pay all. R. Jehudah says : There is no disgrace to slaves. A deaf-mute, an insane person, and a minor, one who meets with them is in a bad position, for the one who wounds them is liable, while if they do so to others they are free. The same is the case with a slave and a (married) woman, with the difference that they must pay when they become inde- pendent ; namely, when the woman is divorced and the slave is liberated. If one, however, assaults his father or mother and bruises them, or, on the Sabbath, any person, he is free from payment of the above-enumerated items, for he is guilty of a capital punishment. One who wounds his own heathen slave is free from everything. GEMARA: R. Elazar questioned Rabh : One who wounds the minor daughter of another, to whom is the compensation to be paid ? Shall we assume that as the Scripture granted the 13 194 THE BABYLONIAN TALMUD. income of a minor daughter to her father, the same is the case with the compensation for a wound inflicted upon her, for her value is diminished thereby; or perhaps the Scripture granted him only the income so far as she is under his control; for in- stance, if he wanted to marry her to one afflicted with scabies he could do so, but as to wounding, if he himself wanted to wound her he must not do so; hence it is an income which is not under his control, and therefore he does not acquire title to it ? He answered : The Scripture granted him only the income first stated. He objected to him from our Mishna: " But for the loss of time when he is his own ? " (Hence we see that the loss of time is considered ; and as the income from the labor of a minor daughter belongs to her father, he shall at least collect for the loss of time ?) Said Abayi: Rabh concedes, as far as this is concerned, that her father gets it up to the age when she be- comes vigorous. He objected again from the following: " One who wounds his grown son, he pays him at once; if he wounds his minor son, he makes an investment with the money he has to pay; if he wounds his minor daughter, he is free; and not only he, but even if others have done so to her, the father gets the payment ? " He answered: This also has reference to loss of time only. There is a contradiction to the above statement that in case of a grown son he pays him at once, from the following: One who wounds another's children — if they are grown persons, he pays them at once ; if they are minors, he makes an investment with the money due ; if his own children, he is free ? This pre- sents no difficulty: The one case treats of where he provides their board, and the other case treats of where he does not. Now, let us see: You interpret the first Boraitha that it treats of where he does not provide their board ; then the last part of same: " If one wounds his minor daughter, he is free, and if others do so to her the payment belongs to him," also treats of where he does not provide her with board — why, then, should the payment belong to him ? must she not pay for her board ?