Babylonian Talmud

Rodkinson 1918 — source 10, scan section 29

force ? Said Rabha: The expression that " both are corner- tithe " means only that both are free from tithe (given to the Levites), as we have learned in the following Boraitha: " One who renounced his ownership to his vineyard and then hast- ened in the morning and plucked the fruit himself, he must o\>- SQVVQ peret [Lev. xix. i6], gleanings [Deut. xxiv. 2i\ peah [Lev. xix. 9], and forgotten heaves [Deut. xxiv. 19], but he is free, however, from the Levites' tithe. MISHNA //. : A jug (filled with water) that broke on pub- lic ground and its contents cause a person to slip and fall, or one is injured by its fragments, he (the carrier of the jug) is liable. R. Jehudah, however, says, if he break it intentionally he is, otherwise he is not. GEMARA: Said R. Jehudah in the name of Rabh : It was taught only if he soil his clothes with the contents of the jug, but if he damage his person there is no liability, for the public ground (which has no particular owner) causes his damage. When I stated this before Samuel he said to me : Let us see ; as to the liability for damage caused by one's stone, knife, or load (placed on public ground), we deduced it from the "pit" on public ground, as explained /^j"/, page in (in which the Scrip- ture reads "■ ox " and " ass "), and in all of them I read ** an ox, but not a human being" ; " an ass, but not vessels," and only as far as death is concerned (as the Scripture in this case speaks of death); as to damage, however, if to person there is, but if to TRACT BABA KAMA (THE FIRST GATE). 6i property there is no liability on the part of the one who placed them there. (Hence Samuel's theory is the reverse of that of Rabh.) What has Rabh to say to this ? This (that we deduce all that from " pit ") is only where he had renounced his owner- ship from them (as such is the case with the pit on public ground), but if he had not it is still his property (and we deduce his liability from the "ox"). R. Oshyiah objected: (There is a Boraitha:) It Is written [Ex. xxi. 33]: " And an ox or an ass fall therein," and we say an ox, but not a human being; an ass, but not vessels ; and from this it was said that if an ox or an ass laden with vessels fell into the pit and they were broken, he is liable only for the injuries to the animal, but not for the damage to the vessels. Similar to this is his stone, knife, and load placed on public ground that cause damage. Therefore if one break his glass vessels by striking them against the stone so placed, he is liable. Now the first part of the Bo- raitha would be in contradiction to Rabh, who holds him liable for the vessels also, and the latter part (which treats of breaking glass vessels by striking them against the stone) would contra- dict Samuel ? [Why would this be a contradiction only to those two ? Do, then, those two parts of the Boraitha itself not contra- dict each other ? Say, then, that Rabh would explain the Bo- raitha in accordance with his theory that he renounce owner- ship, and Samuel according to his theory stated above.] Now, when we come to the conclusion that one's stone, knife, or load is equal to one's ** pit," according to R. Jehudah, who holds that there is a liability for damages done to vessels by falling into a pit, if one strike his bottle against a stone he is liable. Said R. Elazar: Thou shouldst not think that he is liable only when both the stumbling and the breaking were caused by the stone, and not if only the breaking was caused by the stone, as in reality he is liable even in such case, as we con- cur with R. Nathan's theory (which is explained on page 120). '' If intentionally,'' etc. What means intentionally? Said Rabba, when he intended to lower them down from his shoulders (and while doing so they struck against the wall, he is liable, for his carelessness is considered a deliberate act). Said Abayi to him: Should we infer from this that R. Meir (who is very rigor- ous) holds that one is liable even if the jug dissolve of itself (although it is an accident) ? He answered : Yea, R. Meir holds one liable if even only the handle remained in his hand. Why so ? Is this not an accident, and being such, the Scripture frees 62 THE BABYLONIAN TALMUD. him from liability, as it is written [Deut. xxii. 26]: ** But unto the damsel shalt thou not do anything" ? And if you should say that this is only as regards capital punishment, but as re- gards damages one is liable, have we not learned in a Boraitha: " If his jug break and he fail to remove the fragments, or if his camel fall and he fail to raise it, R. Meir holds him liable for the damage they cause ; the sages, however, hold that he is free from human justice and is liable only to heavenly justice; and the sages concede to R. Meir, where one places his stone, knife, or load on the top of a roof, and they are blown down by an ordinary wind and do damage, that he is liable ; on the other hand, R. Meir concedes to the rabbis that, where one places jugs on the roof in order that they should dry, and they are blown down by an extraordinary wind and do damage, he is free" (because it is an accident; hence even according to R. Meir damages by an accidental act are excusable)? Therefore said Abayi: They differ (in our Mishna) in two cases: during the falling and after the vessels rested upon the ground ; one holds that for stumbling while falling he is liable for careless- ness, and the other one holds that it is an accident. And they also differ after the resting of the vessels, in case he renounce his ownership to the articles which caused the damage ; one holds him liable even in such a case, and the other one holds him free. And wherefrom is such a theory ? From the fact that the Mishna mentions two cases, viz. : ** If he slipped on account of the water, or he was injured by the fragments," which is prac- tically one and the same thing, we must say then that it means either when he slipped on account of the water while falling or that he stumbled over the fragments after they rested. But how is it with the above Boraitha, can you apply also to it the same interpretation ? This would be correct regarding the jug con- taining water, but how can we find the above two cases in regard to the camel, as you cannot hold one liable for the stumbling of his animal, even in a case where one is held liable for his own stumbling ; and if there should be a liability it should be only in one case, namely, if he renounced his ownership to the carcass ? Said R. A'ha : It can be explained that the camel stumbled by reason of the overflow of a river. How is the case ? If there was another way, then he is surely liable ; if there was no other way, is it not accident ? Therefore it must be ex-