Babylonian Talmud

Rodkinson 1918 — source 5, scan section 53

suitable for that purpose, R. Eliezer declares him culpable, but R. Jehoshua declares him free. For thus argues R. Eliezer: If a person is held to be culpable for changing the name (denomina- tion) of the paschal sacrifice, which he is allowed to slaughter on Sabbath, does it not follow that if he brought sacrifices which were in themselves prohibited to be brought on the Sabbath, under another denomination, that he must in so much greater a degree be considered culpable ? To this R. Jehoshua replied : " Nay; we cannot apply the decree concerning a sacrifice which was changed to what was prohibited to offer on the Sabbath, to other sacrifices which had been changed to that which was per- mitted to be brought on the Sabbath." R. Eliezer replied: " The offerings brought for the whole congregation of Israel shall prove my assertion, for it is lawful to offer them on the Sabbath for their proper purpose; yet whoever brings other sac- rifices under their denomination is held to be guilty." Then R. Jehoshua rejoined: " Nay; we cannot apply the decree concern- ing the offerings of the whole congregation, which have a deter- minate number, to the paschal sacrifices, which have no deter- minate number." R. Meir said: One who also offers on the Sabbath other offerings under the denomination of those of the congregation is absolved. If a person slaughtered the paschal sacrifice for those who will not partake thereof, or for persons who are not appointed to partake thereof, and for uncircumcised and unclean persons, he is culpable; but if he had slaughtered it for those who will and also for those who will not partake thereof, for those appointed 138 THE BABYLONIAN TALMUD. to eat it and for those who are not, for circumcised as well as for uncircumcised, or for clean and also for unclean persons, he is absolved. If one slaughtered (the paschal lamb) and a blemish was found thereon, he is culpable; but if, after being slaughtered, it was found to be Trephah (prohibited to be eaten) on account of inward blemishes, he is not culpable. If after slaughtering (the lamb) the man was advised that the participants had withdrawn themselves from it, or had died, or become defiled, he is absolved, because when he slaughtered it, it was under lawful circum- stances. GEMARA: How is the case to be considered concerning the man who brought a paschal sacrifice not for its proper purpose ? Shall we assume that he made a mistake (and thought that he was slaughtering another sacrifice), and still he is held culpable ? Whence the inference that the denomination of a thing may also be annulled through error; but this is not so. There- fore it must be assumed that there was no error, but that the man intentionally sacrificed the paschal offering for another pur- pose {f.i., for a peace-ofifering) ; if so, how will the latter clause, to the effect that if he slaughtered other sacrifices to serve for a paschal offering and they were suitable for a paschal offering, R. Jehoshua declares him free, be consistent ; for if he did so inten- tionally, what difference does it make whether the sacrifices were suitable or not, the fact that he sacrificed them on the Sabbath remains — how then could R. Jehoshua declare him free ? Hence it must be assumed that this latter clause refers to one who did so through error, and in such an event the first clause of the Mishna will treat of an intentional case while the next clause will refer to an act committed through error ? Said R. Abin : " Such is indeed the case." R. Itz'hak bar Joseph found R. Abbahu standing amongst a crowd of men in a room and asked him how this Mishna should be understood, and he answered: " The first clause deals with an intentional case and the next clause with an erroneous com mission of an act." R. Itz'hak learned this from R. Abbahu forty times, and he then retained it forever. An objection was made, based upon the Mishna where R. Eliezer said to R. Jehoshua: " If a person is held to be culpable for changing the denomination of the paschal sacrifice," etc. If, however, the first clause treats of an intentional case and the next clause of a case of error, would not R. Eliezer's argument TRACT PESACHIM (PASSOVER). 139 be sufficiently answered by R. Jehoshua simply claiming that the man is free because he committed the deed through error ? R. Jehoshua meant to state: According to my opinion, thy argu- ment does not hold good, from the very fact that I hold a man to be free if he committed the deed by mistake ; but even accord- ing to thy opinion, that a man is also culpable when committing an act through error, thy argument is not effective, for in the first instance the sacrifice was changed to an offering which is prohibited to be brought on Sabbath, while in the second instance the sacrifice was changed to one which might be brought on Sabbath. R. Eliezer replied: "The offerings brought for the whole congregation of Israel shall prove my assertion, for it is lawful to offer them on the Sabbath for their proper purpose ; yet who- ever brings other sacrifices under their denomination is held to be guilty." Then R. Jehoshua rejoined: "We cannot apply the decree concerning the offerings of the whole congregation, which have a determinate number, to the paschal sacrifices, which have no determinate number." Shall we then assume, that where there is a determinate number R. Jehoshua holds a man to be culpable ; have we not learned in the case of where two children were to be circumcised, one on the eve of Sabbath and the other on the Sabbath, and by mistake the father had the one to be circumcised on the eve of Sabbath circumcised on the Sabbath, R. Jehoshua declared him free, although there was just one (i.e., a determinate number) to be circumcised on Sabbath ? Said R. Ami: " The case of the two children to be circumcised was as follows: One of them was to be circumcised on the Sabbath and the other on the eve of Sabbath. When the Sabbath had arrived neither one was yet circumcised, and the father by mis- take had the one who was to have been circumcised on the pre- ceding day circumcised on the Sabbath. In doing this he was confused in the performance of a religious duty, however, and for that reason R. Jehoshua declares him free, while in the case of the offerings for the congregation the actual offerings to be brought had already been sacrificed and the man who brought other offerings under their denomination did so when the relig- ious duty had already been fulfilled, and for that reason he is held to be culpable." What about R. Meir ? Does he declare a man free who had offered other sacrifices under the denomination of those of the congregation, even if the actual congregational offerings had I40 THE BABYLONIAN TALMUD. already been sacrificed ? From R. Meir's explanation * (Sab-