Babylonian Talmud

Rodkinson 1918 — source 1, scan section 74

that they are culpable. It is written [ibid.] : " If any person sin," etc. But if two persons held a date-press, or a log, and carried them out into public ground, R. Jehudah says, if one of the two was not able to carry it himself and they both carried it, they are both culpable, but if either of them was able, both are not culpa- ble. R. Simeon says, even if one alone is not able to carry it and they carried it out together, they are also free. For only referring to such an instance the Scriptures say : " If any person," etc., and it is plain that one is culpable if he performs work alone, but if two persons did one thing they are both free. The master said : If one of the two was able to perform the work alone and the other unable, all agree that he is culpable. Which of them was culpable ? R. Hisda said, the one who was able. As to the one who was unable, why should he be so ? What did he? Said R. Hamnuna to R. Hisda: "Why not? Did he not assist the one who was able ? Answered R. Hisda : Assisting is not of consequence (because if he alone is not able to perform the work himself, his assistance is of no value). Said R. Zbid in the name of Rabha : " We have also learned in a Boraitha in sup- port of this argument : If one suffering from a venereal disease rides an animal, the feet of which are encased in four pieces of cloth, the pieces of cloth are not subject to defilement, for the reason that the animal is able to stand on three feet." Why are they not subject to defilement ? Was not one foot a help to the other three? Hence we must assume that one of the feet must be regarded as a help to the other three; a mere help, however, not having any legal consequence cannot become defiled, and as it is impossible to determine which one of the three feet is to be regarded as a help, all four pieces of cloth encasing them are not subject to defilement. Again the master said : If either of the two were able, R. TRACT SABBATH. 177 Meir holds them both to be culpable. The schoolmen propounded a question : " Must the object carried out by them be of double the prescribed size, i.e., a prescribed size for each of them, in order to make them culpable, or does the prescribed size for one man suffice to make them both culpable ? R. Hisda and R. Hamnuna (both answered) : One of them held that one prescribed size suf- fices, and the other that it must be double in order to make them culpable, (and it is known which of them held to the former opin- ion and which to the latter). Said R. Ashi : " We have also learned in a Boraitha : ' Two men who carried out a reed used by a weaver (into the street) are both culpable.' Why so ? Was not double the prescribed quantity necessary in order to make both culpable? Hence we must assume that the Boraitha holds one prescribed quantity to be sufficient." Said R. Aha, the son of Rabba, to R, Ashi : " What proof do you derive from this Boraitha? Perhaps it refers to a reed that was of sufficient size to cook an egg for one and another for the other?" R. Ashi answered : If such were the case, the Boraitha would say merely a " reed " and not a " reed used by a weaver." Said R. Aha again : " Perhaps the Boraitha refers to a reed of sufficient size to weave a napkin each for both of them ? Therefore it were better to say that from this Boraitha we can derive no support either for one opinion or the other." A certain scholar taught in the presence of R. Na'hman: *' Two men who carried out a reed used by a weaver (into the street) are both not culpable." R. Simeon, however, declares them culpable. How can this be? (Is this not contrary to R. Simeon's usage?; Read then (on the contrary), the scholars said they are culpable and R. Simeon said they are not. MISHNA VI. : If one carry victuals of less than the pre- scribed quantity in a vessel (out into the street) he is not culpable even of (carrying) the vessel, for the vessel is of no consequence to the victuals. If he carried a person on a litter he is not culpa- ble even of (carrying) the litter, because the litter is of no conse- quence to the person. If he carried a corpse on a cot he is cul- pable. The same is the case if (he carries) a part of the corpse of the size of an olive or of a carcass the size of an olive and of a reptile the size of a lentil. R. Simeon declares all of them free. GEMARA : The rabbis taught : " If a man carry out victuals of the prescribed quantity in a vessel, he is culpable of carrying the victuals, but not of (carrying) the vessel, because the vessel is of no consequence to the victuals ; but if the victuals are such that VOL. I. — 12 178 THE BABYLONIAN TALMUD. they cannot be carried otherwise than in a vessel, he is culpable of (carrying) the vessel also." Shall we assume from this teach- ing that if one ate two pieces of tallow each the size of an olive at different times through forgetfulness(and was not reminded of his sin between both times of eating), he is bound to bring two sin- offerings ? Said R. Ashi : In the case of the man who is culpable of (carrying) both the victuals and the vessel, it must be assumed that he carried them through forgetfulness and was subsequently reminded of having carried only one of them (but forgot about the other) ; later he was reminded of having carried the other also, and according to the opinion of the teacher of this Boraitha, he is cul- pable and bound to bring two sin-offerings, one for each time he was reminded. The same difference of opinion exists here as we have seen existed between R. Johanan and R. Simeon b. Lakish (in the chapter concerning the general rule of Sabbath). '' If he carried a person in a litter,'' etc. Shall we assume that the Mishna is in accordance with R. Nathan and not with the rabbis of the following Boraitha? " If one carried out an animal or a bird (into the street), whether alive or slaughtered, he is liable." R. Nathan, however, says : " For (carrying out) a slaugh- tered (animal or bird) he is culpable, but not for one that is alive, because a live creature carries itself." Said Rabha : " It may be said the Mishna is in accordance with the rabbis of the Boraitha cited, as they differ with R. Nathan only concerning animals or birds, which usually struggle to get loose and thus become a bur- den ; but concerning a person, who is carried and agrees to being carried, and virtually carries himself, the rabbis yield to R. Nathan." Said R. Ada b. Ahba to Rabha : How will, in your opinion, the statement in our Mishna be made plain : " Ben Bathyra per- mits the selling of a horse to a Gentile, and a Boraitha, in addition to this, states that the reason that Ben Bathyra permits this is because the Gentile will not perform any work with the horse on